You have a green card, you travel abroad and you come back. At passport control, the officer can treat you in two ways, and the choice changes your life. On 23 June 2026, deciding Blanche v. Lau, the Supreme Court held, 6 to 3, how much certainty that officer needs in order to choose the second. The answer narrows the protection of those returning with a criminal case under way.
The rule the decision interprets
Section 101(a)(13)(C) of the immigration statute says that a permanent resident will not be treated as someone seeking entry when returning from a trip, except in six situations. That is the default rule, and its consequence is large: someone treated as already resident can only be removed on the narrower grounds, and in that case it is the Government that must prove them. Someone treated as seeking entry faces a much wider list of grounds, and there it is you who must prove that you may enter.
The six situations in the statute are these: having abandoned or given up resident status; having been outside the United States for more than 180 continuous days; having engaged in illegal activity after leaving the country; having left while removal proceedings were under way; having committed a crime involving moral turpitude or certain drug offences; and attempting to enter at a time or place other than the one designated by the authorities. The decision deals only with the fifth, and decides nothing about the other five.
The case
Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese national, became a permanent resident in 2007. On 7 May 2012, the state of New Jersey charged him with trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he travelled to China. On his return, on 15 June 2012, he presented himself to the officer at Kennedy airport. Because of the pending charge, the officer did not treat him as already resident: he placed him on parole, an authorization that let him physically enter the country without being formally admitted.
After Lau pleaded guilty, on 24 June 2013, the Government opened removal proceedings, charging that he could not enter because of a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. The immigration judge and the administrative body upheld the removal order. The federal court of appeals in New York struck that order down, holding that the officer should have treated Lau as already resident unless he had, at that moment, clear and convincing evidence that he had committed the crime, which was not the case: there was only the charge. Because that view conflicted with that of two other courts of appeals, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
What the Court decided
The opinion was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett. The Court said the statute does not require the officer to have clear and convincing evidence of the crime before treating the resident as someone seeking entry. And it explained why: removal in these cases has two steps. In the first, for the resident to be treated as seeking entry, it is enough that the crime was committed. In the second, for him actually to be barred from entering, a conviction or a guilty plea is required. Since Lau committed the crime before attempting to return and was later convicted, both steps were satisfied.
The central argument is textual. The statute says a resident may be treated as seeking entry if he has committed a crime identified in another provision, and that other provision identifies crimes without requiring a conviction. In the Court's formulation, the statute imported from there only the list of crimes, not the conviction requirement that exists in that context. The Court further observed that the statute expressly allocates several burdens of proof, but nowhere imposes on the Government the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is seeking entry. And it added that the New York court's view came not from the statute but from a precedent of the administrative body, Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, which places that burden on the Government at the removal hearing, not at the border.
What the Court did not decide
Three points were expressly left open, and it is important not to treat them as settled. First, the Court did not decide whether there is any threshold at the border, or what it would be: it noted that the Government suggested a standard based on the inspecting officer's satisfaction, but said it did not need to reach the question. Second, it did not decide whether the Valenzuela-Felix precedent is correct, because it was not asked. Third, it did not decide whether Lau's crime really involved moral turpitude: it sent the case back to the New York court to decide. What the decision does, then, is remove one specific requirement at the border, not say that nothing is required there.
Why that choice at the airport matters so much
The difference between the two ways of treating you is not formal. It changes the list of grounds that allow your removal, changes who must prove what, and changes your situation while the case runs. The table below summarizes the points that the decision itself and the dissent identify.
| Treated as already resident | Treated as seeking entry | |
|---|---|---|
| Grounds allowing your removal | Narrower list, in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) | Wider list, in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) |
| Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude | Reaches only a crime committed within five years of admission | Reaches a conviction at any time |
| Who must prove it | The Government | You |
| Your situation while the case runs | You keep your status and your resident document | You may be detained or placed on parole; the dissent records the green card being taken |
The dissent, and the concrete cost
Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, argued that the case is one of sequence: the statute says the resident will not be treated as seeking entry unless one of the six situations is present, and that determination, by definition, has to happen at the border, before the officer decides whether to refuse entry, detain, or grant parole. Letting the Government classify first and justify later, with evidence gathered over time, would allow the exception to swallow the rule.
What changes, and for whom
For the great majority of permanent residents, who travel and return with no criminal record at all, the decision changes nothing: the default rule still applies, treating the resident as already resident. The group actually affected is a different and identifiable one: those with a pending criminal charge, those facing proceedings, those with a prior conviction, and those who engaged in conduct that could be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, even without a conviction.
Where this decision applies
The decision is from the Supreme Court and applies nationwide. It resolves a disagreement among the federal courts of appeals: the New York court, whose view was rejected, and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, whose views prevailed. The Third Circuit had adopted an intermediate standard. Since the Court expressly left open whether there is any threshold at the border, the argument over which standard applies may well return to the lower courts, which is why this is a subject to follow rather than treat as closed.
Sources
- Blanche v. Lau, No. 25-429, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), decided 23 June 2026. Opinion by Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ.; dissent by Jackson, J., joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ. Preliminary version, subject to formal revision before official publication.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C), in particular item (v); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) and (c)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
- 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a), on who must prove the grounds for removing a resident.
- Muk Choi Lau v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2025), the decision under review.
- Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2012), whose correctness the Court expressly did not examine.
Updated 29 August 2026. This text discusses a decision issued in preliminary form, still subject to formal revision before official publication, and whose day-to-day application may be the subject of new guidance or new litigation.